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RESPONSE 
PROXY REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A 
PURPOSE: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR 
RYAN 
George W. Dent, Jr.* 
Changing conditions often force us to rethink the role of a law. 
Professor Ryan's scholarly article, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Share-
holder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy/ underscores this 
need. His article is useful for both its successes and its failures. Its 
principal failure is its inability to identify a general justification for 
the rule. This is helpful; the failure of an intelligent and deter-
mined advocate to find a persuasive defense of the rule confirms 
that no defense is possible. The article succeeds principally in 
showing how institutional investors have recently used the rule in 
ways that put the rule in a new light. The new developments de-
mand a response from the rule's critics.2 This reply argues that 
Professor Ryan is right in concluding that the new developments 
justify a role for the rule, but that this role must be more narrowly 
defined than it has been by Professor Ryan. 
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 14(A) 
Professor Ryan's Herculean effort to plumb the legislative his-
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.A. 1969, J.D. 1973, Columbia University; 
LL.M. 1981, New York University. Professor Patrick J. Ryan's article, in which he offered 
justifications for ·SEC rule 14a-8, appeared in Volume 23, Number 1 of the Georgia Law 
Review, Fall 1988. See infra note 1. Rule 14a-8 permits qualified shareholders, at no cost to 
themselves, to include proposals in the corporation's proxy solicitation materials. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.14a-8 (1988). 
• 23 GA. L. REv. 97 (1988). 
2 The author is one of those critics. See Dent, SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory 
Failure, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 1 (1985). See also Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the 
Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REv. 425 (1984) . 
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tory of the Exchange Act makes all the more impressive the lack of 
results. He finds that Congress did intend proxy regulation under 
Section 14 to change corporate governance and to promote "fair 
corporate suffrage. "3 He sees two models of shareholder action re-
flected in the legislative history-shareholders as monitors and 
shareholders as decisionmakers.4 He is undoubtedly correct that 
Congress intended proxy regulation to affect corporate governance, 
but this begs the questions how and why Congress wanted this to 
happen. 
The legislative history's references to shareholder rights and cor-
porate suffrage are few and vague. Read in context, most deal with 
disclosure. An oft-quoted passage in the House Report states that 
"[f]air corporate suffrage is an important right."5 "Fair corporate 
suffrage" is not defined here or anywhere else, but the passage re-
fers to "adequate disclosure," "adequate explanation," and "fairly 
informing the stockholders. "6 The same passage refers to "prevent-
ing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise 
of the voting rights of stockholders."7 The specific abuses men-
tioned in the legislative history all deal with misleading disclosures 
or total nondisclosure to shareholders, generally by managements. 8 
Professor Ryan also makes much of a statement in the Senate 
Report about "major questions of policy, which are decided at 
stockholders' meetings."9 However, the Report speaks only of "ad-
equate knowledge" so that shareholders may be "enlightened'' 
about these questions, not initiate them, and complains of solicita-
tion of proxies "without explanation to the stockholder of the real 
nature of the matters for which authority to cast his vote is 
sought. "10 Similarly, the statement in the Senate Hearings that a 
corporation and its shareholders are "partners in its business" is 
3 Ryan, supra note 1, at 135-36, 145-46, 164. 
' ld. at 140, 146, 165-66, 178-79. 
• H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934). 
• ld. at 13-14. 
7 /d. at 14. 
• The Senate Report, for example, complains of "unscrupulous corporate officials seeking 
to retain control of the management by concealing and distorting facts." S. REP. No. 1455, 
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934). The Report specifically describes one instance of nondisclo-
sure of a management conflict of interest. ld. at 75-76. See also text accompanying infra 
note 10. 
• Ryan, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1934)). 
•• S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1934). 
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used only to support the conclusion that corporations should give 
"definite information at frequent enough periods so that the public 
... might with more intelligence buy its shares. " 11 
Beyond this Professor Ryan finds only a handful of vague com-
ments scattered throughout the voluminous legislative history. 
These comments, mostly made by Thomas Corcoran, a drafter of 
the bill but not a member of Congress, speak of "the protection of 
corporate outsiders from corporate insiders"12 and of "prevent[ing] 
the great mass of unorganized stockholders and bondholders from 
being at the mercy of ... management."13 It is not clear what Mr. 
Corcoran meant by .or what his congressional audience understood 
from these comments. 
Statements in the legislative history supporting the use of proxy 
regulation to interfere with corporate governance are not only 
weak and vague but are also opposed by indications that Congress 
intended to avoid or limit such interference. As Professor Ryan 
recognizes, Congress expressly denied that the Act could be inter-
preted as "authorizing the [SEC] to interfere with the manage-
ment of the affairs of an issuer."14 Professor Ryan construes this 
denial as applying only to "direct SEC management and control of 
a corporation, or of substantive review of management decisions by 
the SEC."15 Although it is true that Congress eschewed direct SEC 
interference in corporate governance, it does not follow that every 
11 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84 (72d Gong.) and S. Res. 56 and S. 
Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6674-75 
(1934) [hereinafter Senate Exchange Act Hearings] (remarks of Richard Whitney, then 
president of the New York Stock Exchange). 
12 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1934) [hereinafter 
House Exchange Act Hearings] (remarks of Thomas Corcoran); Senate Exchange Act 
Hearings, supra note 11, at 6518 (testimony of Mr. Corcoran). 
13 House Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 12, at 138 (remarks of Mr. Corcoran). Since 
bondholders do not vote with shareholders, the reference to bondholders reinforces the con-
clusion that Mr. Corcoran was thinking only of disclosure. 
14 A proposed amendment stating this was therefore eliminated as unnecessary. H.R. REP. 
No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934). See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1934) (denying that the Act empowers the SEC to "interfere in the management of corpo-
rations"). These statements are consistent with President Roosevelt's avowed intention that 
the securities laws "protect the public with the least possible interference to honest busi-
ness." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). See generally Dent, Ancillary Relief 
in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 903-09 
(1983). 
'" Ryan, supra note 1, at 138. 
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818 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:815 
form of indirect interference was permitted, or that rule 14a-8 is 
only an indirect interference. 
Since disclosure is the Exchange Act's "fundamental regulatory 
model,"16 it would not be unreasonable to infer that the intended 
protection and prevention were to come solely from injecting dis-
closure into the existing scheme of state corporate law. At the 
least, Congress had no idea of how, if at all, it wanted the Ex-
change Act to affect corporate governance except through disclos-
ure. Clearly, Congress did not envision shareholder proposals, or 
anything that even remotely resembles shareholder proposals. 
Phrases used by Professor Ryan and other defenders of the rule 
to describe the regime envisioned by Congress must be viewed in 
the light of this legislative history. Professor Ryan understandably 
distances himself from such terms as "corporate democracy"; be-
cause of their vagueness, these terms more hinder than facilitate 
analysis. 17 Unfortunately, Professor Ryan's proposed substitutes, 
seeing shareholders as "monitors" and "decisionmakers,"18 do little 
better. Congress never used these terms, and the preceding discus-
sion shows that Congress did not intend any specific shareholder 
roles that would give these terms content. Given Congress's em-
phasis on disclosure and its desire to limit interference with corpo-
rate governance, one might reasonably conclude that if Congress 
meant shareholders to be "monitors" and "decisionmakers," it 
meant them to be so only as they already were under state law, but 
with the added benefit of full disclosure. While this is not the only 
possible reading of the Act, any broader reading must be cau-
tiously undertaken. 
II. RULE 14A-8 AND "TRADITIONAL" SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
Analyzing the legislative history of the Exchange Act is no more 
than the first step to determining the propriety of rule 14a-8. The 
next steps must be to analyze how shareholder proposals function 
and to ascertain whether that function can be squared with the 
purposes of the Act. The rule can survive even a narrow reading 
of the Act if the function of the rule falls within the narrowly de-
fined purposes of the Act. Unfortunately, Professor Ryan does not 
18 Id. at 125. See also Dent, supra note 14, at 903-05. 
17 See Ryan, supra note 1, at 102, 168, 174. 
18 ld. at 140, 146. 
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take these steps, at least with respect to "traditional"19 proposals. 
He seems to assume that the success of institutional proposals war-
rants the entire rule. 20 The justification for traditional proposals, 
however, is not at all self-evident. 
Reading the Act as strictly limited to disclosure does not neces-
sarily defeat the rule. The initial rationale for the rule was that 
shareholders were entitled, strictly as a matter of disclosure, to be 
informed of proposals that management knew would be offered at 
the shareholders' meeting.21 In practice, however, this rationale 
proved so weak that the SEC and supporters of the rule now rarely 
mention it. The problem with the disclosure explanation is that 
only material information must be disclosed,22 but the feeble sup-
port obtained by traditional proposals showed that shareholders 
did not consider them materiaP3 
Apparently recognizing this, Professor Ryan follows other de-
fenders of the rule in seeking further justifications. He defends the 
rule as a "consultative mechanism" that notifies managements of 
shareholder views, forces managements to articulate reasons for 
their policies, and thereby makes. managements more "legiti-
mate."24 Like other arguments for the rule, these do not weather 
close scrutiny. If shareholder proposals notify managements of 
shareholder views, the clear message delivered for over four de-
cades was that shareholders do not support shareholder proposals. 
Although management's articulation of reasons for its policies is by 
itself desirable, it is not costless. Including shareholder proposals 
•• By "traditional" I mean all proposals other than institutional proposals, which deal 
primarily with takeover defenses. See id. at 101, 111 (describing "the typical rule 14a-8 
proposal"). The line between the two is not sharp. See infra note 35. 
20 See Ryan, supra note 1, at 104 ("rule 14a-8 requires no significant amendments at this 
time"), 136, 147, 160 . 
21 See SEC Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821 & H.R. 2019 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 169-70 (1943); 5 SEC 
Ann. Rep. 60-62 (1939); Dean, Non-Compliance with Proxy Regulations-Effect on Ability 
of Corporations To Hold Valid Meetings, 24 CoRNELL L.Q. 483, 499 (1939). 
22 Rule 14a-9 is typical of the securities laws in forbidding any proxy statement that "is 
false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-9 (1988). 
23 See Dent, supra note 2, at 4-8. 
" Ryan, supra note 1, at 111-12. Professor Ryan also discusses corporate legitimacy in 
greater depth at 168-71, 179-80. Commendably, he eschews some other justifications for the 
rule, such as the tendency to embarrass management into changing its policies. 
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.in proxy statements entails some financial expense/5 and time 
taken by busy executives to explain policies diminshes attention to 
other matters. The tiny handful of small investors who submit 
most proposals26 have no special expertise in deciding how manag-
ers should allocate their time, and it is a mockery of shareholder 
democracy to permit them to do so. Thus, criticism of rule 14a-8 is 
neither managerialist nor anti-shareholder. Most shareholders have 
no love for the rule. Indeed, supporters of the rule opposed sugges:-
tions that shareholders vote on whether to have shareholder pro-
posals in their firm's proxy statements; the supporters realized that 
shareholders would probably vote to eliminate or severely restrict 
shareholder proposals.27 
As for that will-o'-the-wisp, legitimacy, there is no evidence that 
Congress intended to promote it by the Exchange Act (unless such 
an intent is to be found in the Zeitgeist of the early 1930s) or even 
of what Congress would have understood by legitimacy. But even 
assuming that Congress wanted to enhance legitimacy-and how-
ever one defines legitimacy-it is hard to see how rule 14a-8 ad-
vances it. If the vote on a shareholder proposal establishes legiti-
macy, presumably the proponents should accept the results of that 
vote. As Professor Ryan recognizes, 28 however, most proponents do 
not accept shareholder rejection of their proposals but keep sub-
mitting the same proposals over and over. Indeed, habitual propo-
nents often admit-or rather brag-that their objective is not to 
win a shareholder vote but to gain publicity for their pet causes 
and to embarrass management into changing its policies.29 Efforts 
to embarrass management do not buttress its legitimacy but un-
dermine it. 
In sum, analysis of the functioning of rule 14a-8 in light of the 
legislative history of section 14(a) reveals no justification for tradi-
tional proposals. These proposals do not disclose material informa-
tion. Neither do they enhance corporate governance, "fair 
20 See Dent, supra note 2, at 14-16. 
26 As of 1982, nearly half of all shareholder proposals were submitted by just five inves-
tors, two of whom were brothers acting as a team. See id. at 12. Changes in the rule and in 
investor behavior over the last few years have undoubtedly reduced this concentration, but 
most proposals are still submitted by a handful of habituill proponents. 
27 See id. at 12-13. 
28 Ryan, supra note 1, at 121. 
29 See Dent, supra note 2, at 20-22. 
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corporate suffrage," "corporate democracy," corporate "legiti-
macy," or the roles of shareholders as monitors and decisionmakers 
in any reasonable understanding of these terms. Despite this, the 
rule has become firmly established over the last fifty years; it is 
unlikely that a court would invalidate it now. The SEC, however, 
could well conclude that traditional proposals are illegitimate. In 
particular, the Commission could properly decide that where the 
legislative authority for a rule is so weak, the policy basis for the 
rule must be strong. Lacking such a basis, the SEC should repeal 
the rule with respect to traditional proposals. 
Ill INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS 
Standing apart from the traditional shareholder proposal is the 
institutional proposal opposing anti-takeover measures. As Profes~ 
sor Ryan shows, this development is new, having evolved after the 
major critiques of rule 14a-8.30 Unlike most traditional proposals, 
institutional proposals deal with matters of unquestioned impor-
tance to shareholders and attract very substantial shareholder sup-
port. Even under a narrow reading of section 14(a), it is easy to 
justify using rule 14a-8 for this type of proposal. Even if such con-
cepts as "fair corporate suffrage" and "shareholder democ-
racy"-or Professor Ryan's competing concepts of shareholders as 
monitors and decisionmakers-are vague, they surely include a 
right to vote on matters where a majority might well disagree with 
and (state law permitting) overrule management. It is unnecessary 
to resort to such dubious policies as forcing managers to explain 
their policies or promoting managers' "legitimacy." 
It is not even necessary to resort to any corporate governance 
explanation. As noted, the rule was originally explained on disclos-
ure grounds; shareholders were entitled to know about resolutions 
that management knew were to be presented at the shareholders' 
meeting.31 This explanation fell into disfavor when the feeble sup-
port for traditional proposals revealed that shareholders did not 
consider them material. The broad support for many institutional 
proposals, however, shows that shareholders do consider them ma-
terial. Thus, application of 14a-8 to institutional proposals can be 
grounded solely on a narrow disclosure theory of section 14(a). 
30 Ryan, supra note 1, at 147-63. 
31 See supra note 21. 
.l 
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One could argue that even institutional proposals do not deserve 
the treatment granted by rule 14a-8. If institutional investors have 
a large stake in takeovers, arguably they should be willing to pay 
the cost of soliciting proxies to oppose takeover defenses. In fact, 
many campaigns against takeover defenses have been funded by 
institutional investors. 32 The argument for barring them by repeal-
ing 14a-8, however, ignores the economics of shareholder voting. 
Even an institution whose holdings in a portfolio company run to 
tens of millions of dollars still typically owns only a tiny fraction of 
the company's stock. If the institution undertakes a proxy solicita-
tion, it will enjoy only a small part of any resulting benefit, assum-
ing it wins. It must bear the entire cost of the solicitation, though, 
unless it can persuade some other stockholders to share the bur-
den, and even then it inevitably bears a disproportionate share of 
the cost. In short, shareholders face a collective action problem. 
This leads to "rational apathy" of shareholders-the attitude that 
the proper expenditure of time and effort on proxy voting is zero, 
even for a large shareholder.33 Rule 14a-8 can properly be used to 
overcome this collective action problem. 
Unfortunately, Professor Ryan gives no more refined analysis 
than to conclude that the arrival of institutional proposals justifies 
the entire rule. 34 It is true that, having found a baby in the rule, we 
should not throw it out with the bath water. However, it does not 
follow that we must also keep the bath water in order to preserve 
the baby. Rather, we need an analysis that separates the two. 
At least three approaches come to mind. One would permit 
shareholder proposals only in opposition to anti-takeover devices 
since these have generated the most shareholder support. This 
standard might be hard to define, however.35 Also, not all pro-take-
over proposals command substantial support. Support varies ac-
cording to the substance of the proposal, the identity and skill of 
the proponents, and the popularity and skill of management. More 
important, corporate governance seems to be entering a new phase. 
The explosion of mergers, leveraged buyouts, and hostile takeovers 
32 See generally Ryan, supra note 1, at 155-60. 
33 The term "rational apathy" was first coined by Dean Clark. Clark, Vote Buying and 
Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776, 779-83 (1979). 
" See Ryan, supra note 1, at 104, 136, 147, 160. 
•• Many matters are not easily characterized as dealing or not dealing with takeovers, 
especially since the nature of takeover and defensive tactics changes constantly. 
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has raised the stakes for all players. The growth of institutional 
investors has introduced a new shareholder, more willing and able 
than the individual shareholder to challenge the dominance of 
management. As institutional investors play a growing role they 
may move into other areas of corporate governance. This possibil-
ity should not be cut off. 
The SEC could instead limit the rule by substantially raising the 
amount of stock that must be held by proponents, perhaps to $1 
million. This would leave the rule open to institutional investors 
while closing it to gadflies. However, this might seem undemo-
cratic. Further, the validity of a shareholder proposal depends on 
its support, not on the size of the proponent's holdings. 
It would, therefore, be better to take a third approach and con-
dition submission of any proposal upon the posting of a bond to 
cover the corporation's costs, with the bond to be returned if the 
proposal garners a respectable level of shareholder support, per-
haps a minimum of twenty percent. This approach would distin-
guish among proposals on the basis of their likely support. The 
costs of a 14a-8 solicitation are not so great as to deter substantial 
shareholders with the fear that they might occasionally guess 
wrong and have to forfeit the bond. 
Winnowing out unpopular proposals would save corporations a 
little money, but would also pay a more important divi-
dend-increasing shareholder interest in proxy voting. The trivial-
ity and lack of support of most shareholder proposals now exacer-
bates "rational apathy." Shareholders tend to follow the Wall 
Street Rule-sell your stock or vote with management-because 
they know they oppose most shareholder resolutions and cannot 
easily identify the few they would support. Eliminating unpopular 
proposals might not only induce investors to pay closer attention 
to shareholder resolutions but also weaken their strong presump-
tion in favor of management. 
Requiring the posting of a bond would narrow the availability of 
rule 14a-8, but the emergence of institutional shareholder propos-
als also suggests the desirability of broadening the rule in certain 
other respects. A bond would be an adequate screening device and 
should therefore obviate the devices now used to screen out trivial 
proposals, such as the requirements that the proponent own stock 
worth at least $1000 and that any similar proposal previously sub-
824 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:815 
mitted must have received a specified level of support.36 The rule 
also currently bars proposals opposing management resolutions.37 
Thus, if management proposes a shark repellant (that is, an anti-
takeover charter amendment), investors cannot use rule 14a-8 to 
oppose it; they must first use other weapons and only later, if those 
fail, use 14a-8 for a precatory proposal asking management to re-
scind it. This should be changed. If the rule were limited as sug-
gested above, it would then make sense to remove the exclusion for 
proposals opposing management resolutions. 
Perhaps more important, rule 14a-8 currently excludes proposals 
relating to elections to corporate offices.38 Commentators have 
noted the anomaly that the rule excludes the most significant 
shareholder function in corporate governance-the election of di-
rectors.39 The principal reason for the exclusion is that without it 
firms might be forced to list as candidates innumerable small in-
vestors with no significant support. Requiring a bond that would 
be refunded only if the candidate obtains twenty percent of the 
vote could avert this problem and give a boost to serious 
challengers. 
Reform would be politically difficult. Rule 14a-8 has always been 
supported by the few but active investors whose pet projects are 
subsidized by the rule. Although managers dislike the rule, they 
have made little effort to repeal it both because they viewed repeal 
as politically unrealistic and because the costs of the rule are not 
great. A narrower rule that would spotlight significant proposals 
would be opposed not only by the gadflies whom it would exclude, 
but also by managers, who would be threatened by it. For manag-
ers, the current rule that buries serious proposals in a mass of 
trivia, is probably preferable. 
The burgeoning activism of institutional investors also requires 
reconsideration of securities regulation beyond rule 14a-8. Within 
the proxy rules, the SEC could consider measures to facilitate in-
stitutional activity, such as easing the rules against proxy solicita-
tions without filing a proxy statement. 40 The Commission could 
36 Rule 14a-8(a)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1)(i) (1988); rule 14a-8(c)(12), 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8(c)(12) (1988). 
37 Rule 14a-8(c)(9), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1988). 
'
6 Rule 14a-8(c)(8), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1988). 
39 See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 111 (1976). 
40 See rule 14a-2(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1) (1988) (any proxy solicitation ad-
r 
I 
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also require secret ballots so that managers cannot punish inde-
pendent institutional shareholders. 41 Outside the proxy rules, the 
SEC should consider other steps, such as providing shareholders 
who act in concert safe harbors from section 13(d) and from con-
trolling person liability. 
The impact of institutional investor activism on corporate gov-
ernance also needs to be pondered more generally. As Professor 
Ryan notes, managers view institutions warily, and at least some 
public shareholders do also. I, for one, regard the growing asser-
tiveness of institutional investors as highly salutary and as holding 
the potential to solve the central problem of corporate govern-
ance-the separation of ownership and control. 42 Others disagree. 
Professor Ryan has helped to advance the inquiry by his able ex-
amination of how institutional investors have transformed the role 
of rule 14a-8. 
dressed to more than 10 shareholders requires the filing of a proxy statement). 
•• Such punishment is common and takes many forms. See Dent, Toward Unifying Own-
ership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV._ (forthcoming). 
•• See id. 
